The matter is – knowledge  is not viewed as organized or well
organizable.  We now question that.  Why yes and why not.

I am biased in favor that we already are organized  - we do not fall
to pieces; why than when
we use chunk of knowledge is should not have all internal structure
already working, speaking
 generally here.

I introduce the very old idea to look at that part of self and
knowledge that changes itself as we
speak, that records itself and when pick to is already "sitting
in" ( brain that is) organized.
why is not the same on paper or in discourse. I reserve -  this is
only general provocation here.
Also , we are i a limited university with very limited outreach and no
formal responsibility till
we get  the Board going.

It is about invoking agency as the processual knowledge within and as
an individual
operating unit ( individual in the system, too), let say, like agency
of money as budget
( probably favored by finance people this days)  We have these
definitions  clear
in logic.  Why we use it so little only?

For individual that is self; for ontology/ artificially created chunk
of knowledge  it is –
Self operating body of knowledge; I am thinking that Gen G  can not
stop philosophy
 in army since it is running there even after stopped ( sorry) – test
that one  lecture did not die
in the body of knowledge system; that class stopes but the process  of
knowledge
in that clas lives on. How do we put these in the conceptual
framework?

Princeton - this is not critic all the time. The fact that the
deficits picked elsewhere are targeted
in the program is not a criticism.

We do look to see  for the  chunks  of  meta- knowledge that are
naturally (processualy) "know"  where to fall. We do it you too,
nevertheless.
I am privilege to have caught you in this making.

Below, I see as a good sample to think about. Thanks for the needed
courses.

...
from the public web of Princeton Uni:



Syllabus Phi529, Pol 518 Collective Agency Princeton University, Fall
2008

Philip Pettit

Course overview
There are serious issues in ontology as to what agency involves,
whether individuals can unite in groups that simulate individual
agency, and whether this simulation constitutes replication: whether
group agents are agents of an autonomous kind. Equally, there are
serious issues in ethics as to how far collective bodies — presumptive
group agents — can be held responsible as such for what is done in
their name, and whether they should command respect in the manner of
individual agents. And, again, there are serious issues in politics as
to whether the state is or should be a group agent, whether the people
is or should be an agent of the same kind — perhaps the same agent as
the state, under a different name — and what the idea of rule by the
people might involve.
The aim of this seminar is to steer a course through these issues of
ontology, ethics and politics, exploring their connections and
interactions. The first half of the semester will be given to the
ontological questions, the second to the ethical and political issues.
The sessions in the first half will look in turn at: the nature of
individual agency; the nature of joint action; the use of joint action
to simulate individual agency; and the claim that this can generate
relatively autonomous group agents. The sessions in the second half
will investigate group responsibility for action, group rights to
respect, the agency of the state, the claim to agency on behalf of the
people, the idea of popular self-rule, and the law of peoples that
Rawls hails as a model of international justice.
We will try to cover the basic contemporary literature on these
issues. Some material will be from philosophy of mind, some from
philosophy of social science, some from moral and political
philosophy. All of it should be accessible to any graduate student in
philosophy or political theory. As well as introducing that
contemporary literature, the course will make contact, where possible,
with historical material. Many traditional discussions on the nature
of law, the role of government, and the legitimacy of the state turn
on issues about joint action and group agency. Thus the course will
try to connect with the corporation theory of the middle ages, the
idea of sovereignty in Bodin and Hobbes, the theory of group formation
(including, the formation of a people) in Hobbes and Rousseau, and
perhaps some later schools of thought on nationhood and culture.
Provisional plan of sessions

Session 1. 15 Sept. The analysis of agency

How does a natural system, animal or robotic or institutional, get to
count as an agent? And how rich is the variety of agents that are
conceivable? Dealing with these questions will introduce notions like
belief, desire, intention, action, rationality, and reasoning. This
initial session will not be based on advance reading but the
background literature will also be relevant to the following session.

Session 2. 22 Sept. The objectivity of agency

The standard account of agency requires a system to perform or
function in a certain manner, not to be realized in any particular
material or organized in any particular way. Thus, in principle, an
agential system might be composed out of neurons, as with us and other
animals; out of electronic circuits, as with robots; or out of
individual people, as with presumptive group agents. But do the
agential states of the system — beliefs, desires, intentions — do any
work, in that case, over and beyond the work done by more basic,
realizer states? And if they don’t, then is the depiction of a system
as an agent a matter of subjective choice — perhaps a choice forced

WE AT VIRTUAL DO NOT SEE FORCE..... YET:)))